- Torch.Exe

Significant Form. Book Distribution Campaigns Impacting the U. S. and South Korea Significant Form. Book Distribution Campaigns Impacting the U. S. and South Korea. We observed several high volume Form. RKG-110Exe.jpg' alt='- Torch.Exe' title='- Torch.Exe' />Book malware distribution campaigns primarily taking aim at Aerospace, Defense Contractor, and Manufacturing sectors within the U. S. and South Korea during the past few months. The attackers involved in these email campaigns leveraged a variety of distribution mechanisms to deliver the information stealing Form. Book malware, including PDFs with download links. DOC and XLS files with malicious macros. Archive files ZIP, RAR, ACE, and ISOs containing EXE payloads. Citadel20.jpg' alt='- Torch.Exe' title='- Torch.Exe' />The PDF and DOCXLS campaigns primarily impacted the United States and the Archive campaigns largely impacted the Unites States and South Korea. Form. Book Overview. Form. Book is a data stealer and form grabber that has been advertised in various hacking forums since early 2. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the online advertisement for the malware. Figure 1 Form. Book advertisement. Figure 2 Form. Book underground pricing. The malware injects itself into various processes and installs function hooks to log keystrokes, steal clipboard contents, and extract data from HTTP sessions. The malware can also execute commands from a command and control C2 server. The commands include instructing the malware to download and execute files, start processes, shutdown and reboot the system, and steal cookies and local passwords. One of the malwares most interesting features is that it reads Windows ntdll. Weve been using WiX for a while now, and despite the usual gripes about ease of use, its going reasonably well. What Im looking for is useful advice regarding. C462&ssl=1' alt='- Torch.Exe' title='- Torch.Exe' />Get more from the web with Torch Browser. Adobe Photoshop Cs6 Extended Crack. Learn more about this unique browser here. What is isaHelperService. The. exe extension on a filename indicates an exe cutable file. Executable files may, in some cases, harm your computer. We observed several highvolume FormBook malware distribution campaigns primarily taking aim at Aerospace, Defense Contractor, and Manufacturing sectors within the U. In the following table, you can find a list of programs that can open files with. This list is created by collecting extension information reported by. API monitoring mechanisms ineffective. The malware author calls this technique Lagos Island method allegedly originating from a userland rootkit with this name. It also features a persistence method that randomly changes the path, filename, file extension, and the registry key used for persistence. The malware author does not sell the builder, but only sells the panel, and then generates the executable files as a service. Capabilities. Form. Book is a data stealer, but not a full fledged banker banking malware. Call Of Duty 4 Patch 1.4 1.5'>Call Of Duty 4 Patch 1.4 1.5. It does not currently have any extensions or plug ins. Its capabilities include Key logging
Clipboard monitoring
Grabbing HTTPHTTPSSPDYHTTP2 forms and network requests Grabbing passwords from browsers and email clients Screenshots Form. Book can receive the following remote commands from the C2 server Update bot on host system. Download and execute file. Remove bot from host system. Launch a command via Shell. Execute. Clear browser cookies. Reboot system. Shutdown system. Collect passwords and create a screenshot. Download and unpack ZIP archive. Infrastructure. The C2 domains typically leverage less widespread, newer generic top level domains g. TLDs such as. site,. Torch-Browser-uninstall.png' alt='- Torch.Exe' title='- Torch.Exe' />The C2 domains used for this recently observed Form. Book activity have been registered using the Whois. Guard privacy protection service. The server infrastructure is hosted on Blazing. Fast. io, a Ukrainian hosting provider. Each server typically has multiple Form. Book panel installation locations, which could be indicative of an affiliate model. Behavior Details. File Characteristics. Torrent One Tree Hill Season 3 Episode 17. Our analysis in this blog post is based on the following representative sample Filename. MD5 Hash. Size bytesCompile Time. Unavailable. CE8. C3. 22. 89. 25. CC4. DDE9. 68. CB7. 47,6. ZTable 1 Form. Book sample details. Packer. The malware is a self extracting RAR file that starts an Auto. It loader. The Auto. It loader compiles and runs an Auto. It script. The script decrypts the Form. Book payload file, loads it into memory, and then executes it. Installation. The Form. Book malware copies itself to a new location. The malware first chooses one of the following strings to use as a prefix for its installed filename ms, win, gdi, mfc, vga, igfx, user, help, config, update, regsvc, chkdsk, systray, audiodg, certmgr, autochk, taskhost, colorcpl, services, Icon. Cache, Thumb. Cache, Cookies. It then generates two to five random characters and appends those to the chosen string above followed by one of the following file extensions. If the malware is running with elevated privileges, it copies itself to one of the following directories Program. Files Common. Program. FilesIf running with normal privileges, it copies itself to one of the following directories USERPROFILEAPPDATATEMPPersistence. The malware uses the same aforementioned string list with a random string to create a prefix, appends one to five random characters, and uses this value as the registry value name. The malware configures persistence to one of the following two locations depending on its privileges HKCUHKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrent. VersionRunHKCUHKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrent. VersionPoliciesExplorerRun. Startup. The malware creates two 1. The first mutex is the client identifier e. SZBFHHZ. The second mutex value is derived from the C2 information and the username e. LL9. PSC5. 6RW7. Bx. A5.  The malware then iterates over a process listing and calculates a checksum value of process names rather than checking the name itself to figure out which process to inject. The malware may inject itself into browser processes and explorer. Depending on the target process, the malware installs different function hooks see the Function Hooks section for further detail. Anti Analysis. The malware uses several techniques to complicate malware analysis Timing checks using the RDTSC instruction. Calls Nt. Query. Information. Process with Info. Class7 Process. Debug. PortSample path and filename checks sample filename must be shorter than 3. Hash based module blacklist. Hash based process blacklist. Hash based username blacklist. Before communicating, it checks whether the C2 server is present in the hosts file. The results of these tests are then placed into a 1. SHA1 hash is calculated on the array, which will be later used as the decryption key for subsequent strings e. DLL names to load. Failed checks may go unnoticed until the sample tries to load the supporting DLLs
kernel. The correct 1. 6 byte array holding the result of the checks is 0. Having a SHA1 value of 5b. After completing all anti analysis checks, the sample manually maps ntdll. All API functions will have a small stub function in the code that looks up the address of the API in the mapped ntdll. CRC3. 2 checksum of the API name, and sets up the parameters on the stack. This will be followed by a direct register call to the mapped ntdll. This makes regular debugger breakpoints on APIs inoperable, as execution will never go through the system mapped ntdll. Process Injection. The sample loops through all the running processes to find explorer. CRC3. 2 checksum of its process name. It then injects into explorer. API calls avoiding more commonly identifiable techniques such as Write. Process. Memory and Create. Remote. Thread Nt. Map. View. Of. Section. Nt. Set. Context. Thread. Nt. Queue. User. APC
The injected code in the hijacked instance of explorer. Windows executable from the following list svchost. WWAHost. exe, ipconfig. NAPSTAT. EXE, netsh. NETSTAT. EXE, raserver. The original process reads the randomly selected executable from the memory of explorer. Nt. Map. View. Of. Section, Nt. Set. Context. Thread, and Nt. Queue. User. APC. The new process then deletes the original sample and sets up persistence see the Persistence section for more detail.